Security
- Enforce guest ownership and server assignment across Proxmox endpoints
(VM/LXC actions, firewall, backups, tasks, bulk operations, deploy,
LXC/ISO creation, golden template) and WebSocket channels
- Keep the panel's PVE root ticket server-side for consoles; single-use
WebSocket tickets instead of the JWT in URLs; re-check access on open
WebSocket bridges
- Validate identifiers that reach Proxmox API paths and node shell
commands; reject backup archives / foreign volumes in create requests
- Close privilege escalation in user management, TOTP replay, reset-link
poisoning, X-Forwarded-For spoofing, stored XSS (group icons, SVG logos)
- SSH host key pinning (TOFU), encrypted 2FA seeds and notification
secrets, password changes end other sessions, redact secrets in logs
- Quotas count in-flight creations; 2FA failures count toward lockout
Fixes
- Consoles on non-default API ports, large App Store/script files,
interrupted tasks after restart, impersonation lost on token refresh,
HTTPExceptions swallowed into 500s, WebSocket client reconnects
Performance and process
- Fewer DB writes and queries on hot paths, lazy-loaded locales and
heavy pages, off-loop blocking work, indexes (migrations 44-46)
- Deploy waits for backend tests and frontend build; frontend checks
workflow; API bound to loopback without the SSL profile
Critical security and robustness fixes from a code audit:
- WS terminal/VNC now require a JWT (?token=), validate the session,
vms.console permission and VM ownership before bridging to Proxmox
(previously the LXC terminal gave unauthenticated root shell access).
Frontend ConsolePage passes the token in both WS URLs.
- Fix SSH fallback for `pvecm delnode`: SSHClient now supports password
auth (it previously crashed with TypeError); ProxmoxClient stores the
password for SSH fallbacks and the host port suffix is stripped.
- Add production startup warnings for default ADMIN_PASSWORD and wildcard
CORS_ORIGINS.
- dashboard: use tz-aware utcnow() instead of naive datetime.utcnow().
- crypto: narrow decrypt_value except to InvalidToken and log failures.
- ssh_client: guard the shared connection cache with a lock; make
unknown-host-key rejection opt-in via SSH_REJECT_UNKNOWN_HOSTS.
- logging: send loguru console output to stderr instead of stdout.
- Sync version fallback to 1.5.1; remove one-off refactor scripts.
- Add CODE_REVIEW.md audit report.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypt Proxmox server passwords and VM cloud-init passwords in the database:
- Add backend/app/crypto.py: Fernet-based encrypt/decrypt helpers + EncryptedString
SQLAlchemy TypeDecorator (transparent to all existing code, no API changes)
- Add FERNET_KEY config field (env var); without it values stay plaintext for
backward compatibility, with a logged warning
- Update models.py: ProxmoxServer.password and VMInstance.cloud_init_password
now use EncryptedString(255) instead of String(255)
- Add migration 14 in migrations/migrations.py: idempotent re-encryption of
existing plaintext rows (skipped when FERNET_KEY is not set)
CSRF analysis:
- /api/auth/change-password is protected by JWT Bearer token (Authorization header)
- Browsers cannot auto-include Authorization headers cross-site → CSRF is not
applicable here; added explanatory comment
Improve migration loading:
- Add migrations/__init__.py to make it a proper Python package
- Replace fragile importlib dynamic loading in main.py with a standard import
https://claude.ai/code/session_019rK2wvaWg5zXFwmAPPEB7R
